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Abstract
Racial stereotyping has been found to handicap African-American and Latino candidates in neg-
ative ways (Terkildsen 1993, Sigelman 1995). It is less clear how racial stereotypes may change the
fortunes of Asian candidates. This paper explores the candidacies of Asian Americans with an ex-
periment run through Amazon Mechanical Turk as well as real world evaluations of Asian-American
candidates using the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study. In my experiments, I find that Asian
candidates do significantly better than white candidates across different biographical scenarios (con-
servative, liberal, and foreign). I find that, contrary to expectations, Asian candidates are not signif-
icantly disadvantaged from being immigrant and foreign born. My experimental results mirror my
observational results, which show that Asian Democrats are significantly advantaged even when com-
pared to whites. These results indicate that Asian candidates in America face a set of racial-political
stereotypes that are unique to their racial subgroup.
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†A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2015 annual meeting of the Western Political
Science Association. I would like to thank Marisa Abrajano, Christopher Fariss, James Fowler, Zoltan
Hajnal, Hans Hassell, Gary Jacobson, Nazita Lejavardi, Taeku Lee, Brad LeVeck, Kelly Matush, Maya
Oren, David Searle, the journal editors, and the anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments
and suggestions.
1 Introduction
From 1950 to 2000, a total of nine candidates of Asian or Pacific Islander descent sought a seat in the
U.S. Congress and won. Since the turn of the century, 16 Asian candidates have been elected to Congress.
The 2012 election alone saw the election of five new members of Congress of Asian descent. In addition
to Congress, Asians have been elected chief executive of politically and racially diverse states such as
Washington (Gary Locke), Louisiana (Bobby Jindal), and South Carolina (Nikki Haley), as well as cities
such as Oakland (Jean Quan), San Francisco (Ed Lee), and Garden Grove (Bao Nguyen). Not only are
Asian candidates seeking office at the highest rate in American history, but they are also winning in
racially diverse districts that range from majority white to majority Latino or African American (Census,
2012).
Despite Asian Americans being the one of the fastest growing minority groups in America (Cen-
sus, 2013) and the increasing success of Asian candidates, the literature on race and ethnic politics
lacks a clear understanding of what effect, if any, race has on the candidacies of Asian Americans.
Extensive work on the candidacies of blacks and Latinos has found that white voters often incorporate
racial stereotypes into the evaluation of their candidates (Terkildsen, 1993; McDermott, 1998; Kinder
and Dale-Riddle, 2012). The thrust of this literature has found that a candidate’s race has an overall neg-
ative effect on the perception of the candidate among whites (Schaffner, 2011; Kinder and Dale-Riddle,
2012; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2013; Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau, 2010; Highton, 2011). Studies about
African-American and Latino congressional candidates find that they are perceived as more ideologi-
cally liberal and less competent than their white counterparts (Jacobsmeier, 2014; Sigelman et al., 1995;
McDermott, 1998). What has remained unexplored is whether Asian candidates suffer a similar racial
handicap.
The racial stereotypes of Asians are distinct from those of blacks and Latinos. Asians are seen as
the “model” minority, possessing positive traits like industriousness and intelligence (Chou and Feagin,
2008). On the other hand, at various times in American history, Asian Americans have been seen as a
foreign threat (Chang, 2004; Kim, 1999; Chou and Feagin, 2008), a stereotype which persists into the
modern day (Lee, 2000; Wu, 2003). The overall socio-economic status of Asian Americans also makes
them distinct from blacks and Latinos. Asians are more likely to have a higher median income and have
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higher educational attainment than than blacks or Latinos (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson and Stringfellow,
2010). How these impressions and characteristics of Asians might play into the evaluation of Asian
candidates remains an open question.
In order to test whether the popular racial stereotypes of Asians have an effect on the outcome of
their political candidacies, I utilize an experiment meant to isolate the effect of the Asian racial cue as
well as test the interaction of candidate race with ideological cues and foreign-born/immigrant cues.1
I supplement this experiment with an observational study of real-world Asian candidates competing in
congressional elections.
In my experiments, I find that Asian candidates are actually favored by whites in the vote when
compared to white candidates with the same biography in an election with minimal political cues and
where both candidates are portrayed as politically neutral. In addition, I find that foreign-born Asian
candidates are significantly advantaged in terms of vote choice as well, suggesting that Asian candidates
are not handicapped by foreignness. The results of the observational study mirror the results of the
experimental study. I observe that Asian candidates, specifically Asian Democrats, are seen as less
ideologically extreme and more competent, and have a sizable advantage in the vote when compared to
black, Latino, and even white candidates with similar qualities.
While traditionally race has been seen as a hinderance on minority candidates, these results point to
a racial dynamic of American politics in which race may be a benefit to certain groups under certain
contexts. In addition, these findings speak to the unique position in which Asians find themselves in
American politics; as members of a minority group that is seen as at least politically proximal to whites
and superior to their black and Latino counterparts.
1This paper primarily looks at the candidacies of East-Asians, while recognizing that different stereo-
types might apply to different sub-groups of Asians. The stereotypes that might afflict South-Asian and
Middle-Eastern candidacies, as well as inter-ethnic variations, might produce results significantly differ-
ent from those presented in this paper. This avenue of research should be explored in a separate project.
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2 Asian Americans and Minority Candidate Evaluation
2.1 Candidate Race as an Informational Heuristic
Voters often use informational heuristics, such as partisan affiliation or incumbency, in evaluating their
candidates (Popkin, 1994). Studies of the effect of race on minority candidates have found that voters
do indeed use race to cue in on a candidate’s personal and political qualities, whether it be ideology,
integrity, or competence.
The thrust of the literature on race and candidate evaluation has found that voters often impute group-
based stereotypes onto black and Latino candidates. Generally these group-based stereotypes include
both political stereotypes and social stereotypes. Bobo (2001) finds that whites are more likely to see
blacks and Latinos as politically liberal and more supportive of social welfare policies. In addition, he
also finds that blacks and Latinos are seen as are seen as less trustworthy than whites or Asians. These
racial stereotypes have in turn been found to apply to black and Latino candidates for political office.
Experimental and observational studies have found that both black and Latino candidates are seen as
more liberal and less competent than whites (Sigelman et al., 1995; Visalvanich, 2016). These findings
are echoed byMcDermott (1998), who finds that blacks are perceived as more likely to hold liberal policy
positions that are pro-social welfare. This literature indicates that group-based stereotyping is a major
component of minority candidate evaluation.
If a white electorate imputes its stereotypes and prejudices onto black and Latino candidates, it stands
to reason that Asian candidates are afflicted by their own social and political stereotypes as well. How-
ever, a rigorous examination of how group based stereotyping may apply to Asian candidates has yet to
be conducted. The primary contribution of this paper is to explore this question, both with experiments
and observational data. Using preexisting theories and empirical findings about stereotypes of Asians in
America, I present several different hypotheses of how racial stereotyping might affect Asian political
candidates.
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2.2 The Stereotyping of Asians in America
In order to properly examine how group-based stereotyping may influence Asian candidacies, it is
important to first examine empirical studies of public opinion towards Asians in America. The thrust of
many of these studies finds that Asians are subject to a very distinct set of socio-political stereotyping
when compared to blacks and Latinos. Bobo (2001) finds that while whites are more likely to perceive
Latinos and blacks as “less intelligent” and “more demanding of welfare,” these stereotypes do not apply
to Asians. Unlike blacks and Latinos, Asians in America are often associated with what can be considered
positive racial stereotyping even when compared to whites. Bowler and Segura (2011) examine racial
stereotypes across subgroups and find that Asians as a group are seen as both more hardworking and more
intelligent when compared to other minority groups, especially blacks and Latinos. Interestingly, white
respondents view Asians very positively when compared to whites as a subgroup themselves. Bowler and
Segura (2011) also finds that 39.2% of white respondents from the 2008 American National Elections
Study rated Asians as more hardworking than whites, while 43.1% of white respondents rated Asians as
equally as hardworking as whites. In the same survey, 27.5% of white respondents rated Asians as more
intelligent than whites, while 50.4% of respondents rated Asians as equally as intelligent as whites. In
the same survey, white respondents were significantly less likely to rate African-Americans and Latinos
as more intelligent or hardworking when compared to whites themselves, setting up Asians as a minority
sub-group that whites view positively.
Asians have also been stereotyped as apolitical and non-threatening (Chang, 2001). Taken on the
whole, these stereotypes fit into a “model-minority” narrative of Asians in America (Kim, 1999). In
Kim’s conception, the portrayal of Asians as a model-minority is meant as a tool to shame other races
and sustain white supremacy. Other studies have debunked the model minority narrative as overly sim-
plistic (Chou and Feagin, 2008), but survey research has shown that whites do apply model minority
stereotypes to Asians as a whole. Bobo (2001) finds that Asians are seen as trustworthy, industrious, and
less threatening than blacks or Latinos. And while many aspects of the model minority stereotype of
Asians are overly simplistic, some are grounded in accurate socio-economic qualities of the Asian com-
munity as a whole. For instance, while Asian Americans have had an increasing affiliation towards the
Democratic Party (Wong et al., 2011), many Asian Americans still choose to not identify with any polit-
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ical party (Hajnal and Lee, 2011), fitting into the stereotype of Asians as apolitical. In addition, Asians
are much more likely to come from a middle- or upper-class background (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson and
Stringfellow, 2010), a trait that also fits the stereotype of Asians as hard-working and industrious.
The model minority stereotyping also coincides with many of the positive qualities, that voters value
in their candidates, also known as “valence” qualities(Stokes, 1963; Burden, 2004; Stone and Simas,
2010). From this positive stereotyping of Asians, I posit the first of three hypotheses.
• Asian Advantage Hypothesis - Because Asians are stereotyped as having positive racial qualities,
they will be evaluated as equal to or favorably compared to whites.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily a given that Asian candidates will benefit racial stereotypes in
all instances. The negative stereotypes of Asians are not of the same nature as those of blacks or Latinos,
who are seen as less competent and connected to crime and violence. Asians are often stereotyped as
“perpetually foreign,” inscrutable, and, as a result, less trustworthy than white candidates (Kim, 1999;
Lee, 2000; Wu, 2003). Lee (2000) finds that the perpetual foreigner stereotype is pervasive, with a
majority of Asians surveyed claiming to have been victims of this kind of discrimination. Kuo, Malhotra
andMo (2014) finds similarly that foreign stigmatization contributes to Asian-American political identity.
This, in turn, affects non-Asian attitudes towards social policy considered favorable towards Asians.
People who are more likely to believe in Asian stereotypes are also more likely to oppose issues like
legal immigration or reparations for Japanese Americans.
How might foreignness stereotyping afflict Asian candidates? Many Asian candidates who do run for
office are either first- or second-generation Americans, reflecting the fact that Asians are still a mostly
immigrant community (Chang, 2001). Questions about loyalty to America or general trustworthiness
might undermine Asian candidacies. The internment of Japanese-American citizens is still a reminder
that Asian-American citizens are not immune from prejudicial treatment. A brief look at Asian candidates
who run for office shows that often they seek to emphasize their ties to the community and their personal
history, perhaps in an attempt to combat these stereotypes. For instance, former Oakland Mayor Jean
Quan’s website features an extensive political history that emphasizes a life-long residence in the city of
Oakland and a lifetime of service to the city as a public official.
From the “foreign threat” stereotype of Asians in America, I posit my second hypothesis.
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• Foreign Threat Hypothesis - Because Asians are stereotyped as perpetually foreign, candidates
who are seen as foreign will be evaluated less favorably compared to whites.
Finally, we need to consider how the Asian racial cue might interact with partisan political cues.
Partisan identification has proven to be a dominant force in American politics, influencing all aspects of
candidate evaluation (Campbell et al., 1960; Popkin, 1994; Bartels, 2000). While race has been shown to
function as an informational heuristic for voters, in an era of increased polarization, partisan cues motivate
not just vote choice but also how voters process political information (Nicholson, 2011; Rahn, 1993).
Given the strength of partisanship, ideological cues will either overwhelm or significantly diminish the
effect of the Asian racial cue. I posit the last of my hypotheses:
• Ideological Hypothesis - Given the polarizing nature of ideological cues, any effect the racial cue
has on Asian candidates will be diminished or extinguished by ideological cues.
3 Asian Candidates: An Experimental Manipulation
In order to test the effect of race on the candidacies of East Asians, I designed a survey experiment that
presented respondents with the biographies of two fictional candidates running a contested election for
local office. The survey asked respondents to evaluate each candidate’s ideological leaning and prospec-
tive performance, and then to choose who they would hypothetically vote for in that election. This survey
experiment was administered through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is a web-
site where requesters publish tasks (called Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs) and provide payment to
those who choose to participate. Those who request a task can limit the availability of the task to respon-
dents who have certain characteristics such as age or location. Recruitment through Mechanical Turk is
similar to other web-based approaches such as YouGov that maintain panels of participants and invite
them to participate in studies in exchange for a payment or other incentive.
[Table 2 About Here]
Respondents were paid 50 cents per valid response and the average time for completion of the survey
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was eight minutes.2 In total, a sample of 2,443 respondents were recruited into the sample. Of that
initial sample, 1,652 self-identified as racially white. Since this study is an exploration of white attitudes
toward Asian candidates, I look exclusively at white respondents. Table 2 summarizes the demographic
qualities of this sample. The respondents recruited through Mechanical Turk lean Democratic and tend
to be poorer, less educated, and younger. Despite the skew in the sample, respondents recruited through
Mechanical Turk are still more representative than experimental convenience samples commonly used in
social science (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling, 2011). And while self-
identified Democrats outnumber Republicans in the sample, there were still enough Republican identifiers
to make cross-partisan comparisons in my analysis.
Respondents were randomly assigned into three different experimental scenarios and a control sce-
nario. Subjects were randomly assigned into these scenarios using Qualtrics’s complete randomization
process. I also ran a Hotelling balance test, which revealed no significant differences in the demographic
characteristics or political and ideological orientation of respondents in each of these experiments. Each
subject was exposed to only one of the experiments.
The first experiment is a is a “low-information” scenario that is meant to isolate the effect of race
on candidate evaluation without other political cues, such as issue positions and political ideology. This
represents a one-factor, between-subjects experiment. The low-information scenario features biographies
2Previous research has found that subjects recruited via Mechanical Turk are equally as attentive as
subjects used in laboratory experiments (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis, 2010). In order to ensure that
respondents were reading the questions fully, I included a manipulation check, which asked respondents
to answer a specific question in a specific way in order to ensure they were paying attention. Answering
this question incorrectly would lead to a prompt that told the respondents, “You are not reading the
questions fully. Please read the questions in their entirety before answering the questions.” This prompt
is meant to deter respondents from just clicking through the questions. Berinsky, Margolis and Sances
(2013) find that making individuals aware of their failure to pay attention through these checks leads
them to engage at similar levels to those who are fully aware throughout the experiment. For that reason,
I decided to keep these respondents in the sample.
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of two candidates who are competing with each other for a seat on the San Diego City Council. A local
office was chosen for external validity; it is plausible that a city council race would be a non ideological
and non partisan contest. Biography A features a candidate who was born locally and who promises
to “promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools.”
Biography B also features a local candidate who promises a “commitment to constituent services as well
as public safety and disaster planning.” Each biography is paired with a picture and name of either an
Asian candidate (David Wong) or a white candidate (Carl Guenther). The pairing is randomly assigned
to each respondent.3
The second experiment is an “ideological” scenario. In this treatment, respondents are given two
candidates with distinct political ideologies, and are asked to evaluate both of them. Respondents are
presented with either a liberal Asian candidate running against a conservative white candidate or a liberal
white candidate running against a conservative Asian candidate. This represents a two-factor, between-
subjects experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to see whether any racial effect from the low-
information treatment carries over when other political cues are added. The liberal biography features
a candidate described as a “liberal progressive” with the endorsement of “environmental groups” and
“labor unions” who promises to “expand social programs for the urban poor” while in office. The con-
servative biography features a candidate who is described as a “business-friendly conservative” with the
endorsement of “local business groups” and the “Chamber of Commerce” who promises to “lessen the
regulatory burden on businesses” while in office. Like the low-information scenario, respondents were
randomly assigned whether the liberal or conservative biography featured a picture and name of a locally
3San Diego was also chosen because it is a city with a significant Asian population, and so an Asian
candidate could plausibly run for local office there. A Chinese name was chosen because Chinese-
Americans are the largest Asian immigrant group in America, but also because the group includes a
significant number of second and third generation Chinese, thus making for an easier experimental ma-
nipulation between the native and foreign conditions. A German name was chosen becuase the distinc-
tiveness of a German name is more likely to cue foreignness. The text of the candidate biographies
appears in the appendix.
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based Asian candidate or a white candidate.
The third experiment is a “foreign-born” scenario, in which one of the candidates is a foreign-born im-
migrant who competes against a native-born candidate. Respondents are presented with either a foreign
Asian candidate running against a native white candidate or a foreign white candidate running against a
native Asian candidate. This represents a two-factor, between-subjects experiment. The purpose of this
experiment is to see whether East-Asian candidates are significantly disadvantaged if they are foreign-
born immigrants. The foreign-born biography features either a foreign-born Asian candidate with a
foreign name (“Yuan Wong,” in contrast to the low/ideological information’s more Anglicized “David
Wong”) running against an American-born white candidate or a foreign-born white candidate with a for-
eign name (“Gerhard Guenther”) running against an American born Asian candidate. In order to isolate
the effect of “foreignness” on candidate perception, both candidates were presented without any other
overt partisan or ideological cues. The immigrant/foreign candidate is presented as a member of immi-
grant advocacy groups and a proponent of immigrant interests.
Finally, there is a “control” scenario, which features a white candidate versus a white candidate with
minimal cues. The control is meant to establish a baseline for a broader comparison.
All respondents are given a pre-treatment survey that asked a normal array of demographic questions,
including questions pertaining to partisan identification, partisan lean, education, income, age, race, and
gender. After being randomly assigned a treatment scenario, each respondent is asked to evaluate his or
her candidates’ ideologies and probable performance in office, and indicate who he or she would vote
for if he or she was were to vote in the election. The ideology rating is five point ordered scale (1=Very
Conservative, 2=Conservative, 3=Moderate, 4=Liberal, 5=Very Liberal). The performance metric is also
ranked on a five point ordered scale (1=Very Poorly, 2=Moderately Poorly, 3=Average, 4=Moderately
Well, 5=Very Well). The vote, ideology rating, and probable performance are the three main ways I
measure my dependent variable, candidate perception.
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4 Experimental Results
4.1 Asian Candidates in a Low-Information Environment
[Figure 1 about here]
I start my analysis by examining the effect of race on East-Asian candidacies in a the low-information
treatment scenario.4 Although both biographies in the low-information scenario were written to minimize
political cues, there is a possibility that certain aspects of each specific biography will advantage one
biography over the other. Therefore, I examine the results for Biography A and Biography B separately.
Figure 1 shows the rate in which respondents chose to vote for either candidate, split by race and by
biography. Respondents were, on a whole, more predisposed to support the candidate with Biography
A. However, Asian candidates with this biography did significantly better than white candidates by a
substantial margin. Asian candidates with Biography A drew 80% of the vote. On the other hand, white
candidates with the same biography drew 60% of the vote. While respondents were less likely to support
Biography B, Asians with this biography were still advantaged when compared to white candidates with
the same biography. A difference-in-proportions test yields a p-value of Pr(T < t) ⇡ 0.0000. At first
glance, it appears that Asian candidates are actually advantaged because of their race.
[Figure 2 about here]
A more thorough examination of the data reveals that Asian candidates do significantly better in
other metrics of evaluation as well. Figure 2 compares the ideological evaluation and the performance
4As a manipulation check, I asked the respondents a series questions about whether they thought each
respective candidate would support or oppose specific racial policies. The two issues that specifically
referenced race were whether the respondent thought the candidate would support or oppose “efforts
to help local businesses expand local trade with Asia” as well as “affirmative action for Asian hires
in local government.” Respondents were significantly more likely to say that Asian candidates would
support these measures across all treatment conditions, which indicates that respondents received the
racial treatment.
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evaluation between Asian and white candidates in a low-information scenario, with both biographies
combined for this analysis. Asian candidates are seen as more moderate, with an average rating of 2.95
on the scale, close to the “moderate” rating of 3. Respondents, on average, rated the white candidate
as more ideologically conservative, with an average rating of 3.21. This difference between white and
Asian candidates in ideological rating is not statistically significant. White respondents, however, are
significantly more likely to say that Asian candidates will preform better in office than white candidates
with the identical biography, and this difference is statistically significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.0002).
On the whole, the results in the low-information scenario provides strong evidence that Asian candi-
dates actually benefit from their race. Asian candidates are seen as better able to perform and are better
liked than white candidates with the same biography. This result supports the Asian-advantage hypothe-
sis. The next step in my analysis examines whether this racial advantage holds when we add ideological
cues into the mix.
4.2 Asian Candidates in a Ideological Information Environment
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the vote total for white and Asian liberals as well as for white and Asian conservatives.
A comparison of white liberals versus Asian liberals reveals a slight advantage for Asian candidates.
Asian liberals received 70% of the vote from white respondents. White liberals, on the other hand, re-
ceived 64% of the vote. This difference is statistically significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.03). Asian conservatives
maintain a similar advantage over their white conservative counterparts. Asian conservative candidates
received 36% of the vote while white conservative candidates received 30% of the vote. This difference
is not statistically significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.09), however it is close to statistical significance. Overall,
these results indicate that Asian candidates do maintain an advantage in the vote even when ideological
cues are added. However, the results also indicate that the extent of this advantage is diminished signifi-
cantly when compared to the low-information scenario. Asian candidates in the low-information scenario
had a 20% advantage over their white counterparts. Adding ideological cues reduced this advantage to
6%.
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[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows a comparison in ideological and performance ratings of Asian and white liberal can-
didates as well as Asian and white conservative candidates. There is no significant difference in most of
the perceptual ratings of Asian and white candidates of both conservative and liberal biographies. The
difference in ideological rating of liberal candidates is statistically significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.025), with
Asian liberals being seen as slightly more moderate than white liberals. This difference is marginal at
best, however. All the other perceptual measures yield insignificant differences between the races.
On the whole, these results suggest that the addition of ideological cues reduces the positive benefit
of race for Asian candidates significantly. A comparison of the results of the low-information treatment
to the ideological treatment supports the ideological hypothesis that the addition of ideological cues will
diminish the effect of race for Asian candidates. A difference-in-differences test in the vote between the
low-information and ideological treatments is significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.000). While Asian candidates
in the ideological scenario maintain a marginal advantage in vote choice, they lose their advantage in all
other measures of candidate perception.
4.3 Asian Candidates in a Foreign Born/Immigrant Information Environment
[Figure 5 about here]
The last experiment I explore examines Asian and white candidates in a foreign-born/immigrant sce-
nario. In this experiment, one of the candidates, either white or Asian, is given a foreign-born biography
(with the country of origin being either Germany or China) and a foreign-sounding name. If the for-
eign threat hypothesis is supported, then we should observe foreign Asian candidates doing significantly
worse than foreign white candidates and native Asian candidates.
Figure 5 shows the vote for foreign and native candidates of both white and Asian races. Contrary to
the expectations of the foreign-threat hypothesis, foreign candidates actually do significantly better than
all other candidate types in the foreign-born/immigrant scenario. Asian candidates with a foreign biog-
raphy drew 65% of the vote, while white candidates with a foreign biography drew 42% of the vote and
Asian candidates with a native biography drew 58% of the vote. Not only do Asian foreign candidates do
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significantly better than white foreign candidates with virtually the same biography (Pr(T > t)⇡ 0.000),
they do significantly better than Asian native candidates as well (Pr(T > t) = 0.0419). These counter
intuitive results suggest that not only are Asian candidates not handicapped by a foreign-born biography,
they actually benefit from the cue. I discuss what might be driving these results in the discussion and
conclusion section.
4.4 The Effect of Respondent Partisanship
Thus far, I have found that Asian candidates are advantaged compared to white candidates in each of
the three different informational scenarios, although this advantage is diminished significantly in an ideo-
logical scenario. While these results offer strong evidence in support of the Asian advantage hypothesis,
it is possible that they are driven by the liberal and Democratic skew of the sample. In order to ensure
that this is not the case, I turn to a parametric test using a logit model with vote for the Asian candidate
as the main dependent variable and with a party identification interaction for each of the experimental
scenarios. By examining the interaction, I am able to see whether self-identified Republicans are less
likely to support an Asian candidate.
[Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 2 show the results of the logit model with the Republican party identification
interacted within each of the experimental scenarios. These findings show that, by and large, a candidate
being Asian has either a positive effect among self-identified Republicans, or there are no distinguishable
effects. The positive effect is especially strong for Asian conservative candidates, who are significantly
more likely to draw support from Republican respondents. The notable exception to this general finding
(of either a null or positive effect for Asian candidates) is that Republicans are less likely to support an
Asian liberal candidate, indicating that Republican respondents do penalize Asian candidates becuase of
their race, but only if those candidates are liberals.
However, while these experimental results point to a strong and persistent advantage for Asian can-
didates, any experiment is subject to questions of external validity. Experimental studies on black and
Latino candidates (Terkildsen, 1993; Sigelman et al., 1995; McDermott, 1998) have found a persistent
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bias against these candidates. However, observational research has found that race has a minimal effect
on candidate evaluation (Highton, 2004). For this study, I am able to bridge this gap in research design
by examining observational data on Asian candidates as a compliment to my experimental results.
5 Asian Candidates: An Observational Look
[Table 4 about here]
Until very recently, scholars have been unable to throughly explore the candidacies of Asian Ameri-
cans with observational data. The has been due primarily to a general lack of Asian candidates, especially
for national office, as well as a related lack of comprehensive observational data that feature Asian can-
didates. Fortunately, the 2010 and 2012 U.S. Congressional elections featured the most diverse array of
candidates to run at the national level in American history. Table 3 shows the racial makeup for candidates
for Congress in 2010 and 2012. These two election cycles featured a significant portion of candidates of
Asian descent. Most Asian candidates who ran did so as Democrats and during this time no Asian Re-
publican was elected to Congress. This indicates that for many Asian candidates, the Democratic Party
remains the primary vehicle to attain elected office at the Congressional level.
By utilizing the racial diversity of the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES) (An-
solabehere, 2010, 2012),5 I am able to put together a dataset that can thoroughly examine the candidacies
of Asians at the national level for the first time. The primary strength of the CCES lies in its large size.
Between the 2010 and 2012 CCES there were roughly 100,000 respondents. This large sample size gives
us the ability to examine respondent-level responses to minority candidates across the country. Taken in
conjunction with the historically high number of Asian candidates who ran for Congress between these
two elections, I am able to examine white responses to Asian candidates observationally in order to see if
the strength of Asian candidates in the experimental design mirror their strength in real world elections.
The CCES is not only unique in its size and scope, it also features survey questions that allow me to
5More information on the CCES can be found at http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces
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test some of the same hypotheses I tested with the experimental study. In addition to asking respondents
for whom they voted, the CCES also asks respondents to rate their candidates’ ideological orientation as
well as to assess their competence. Not only am I able to test whether Asian candidates have an advan-
tage in the vote, but I am also able to examine whether Asian candidates are perceived as ideologically
distinct from other candidates with comparable candidate qualities. In addition, I am able to compare
how respondents view the competence of Asian candidates versus candidates with similar qualities.
Because part of my analysis focuses on ideological perception of candidates, I chose to incorporate
candidate ideal-point estimations based on campaign finance donations (called Campaign Finance Scores,
or Cfscores), a technique pioneered by Bonica (2014), into my analysis. I chose to use Cfscores in my
analysis because they allow me to analyze challengers and incumbents using a uniform measure.
Because this study focuses on white responses to Asian candidates, I look only at white respondents.
In addition, because there were so few Asian Republicans who ran, and no Asian Republican incumbents
who ran in a biracial election, I also limit my observational analysis to Democratic candidates. I also
dropped races in which the incumbent was unchallenged. Unfortunately, the nature of the data sample
does not allow me to test the foreign-threat hypothesis since there is no question that gets at how foreign
respondents perceive the candidates to be, and almost all the candidates who ran at the Congressional
level were native-born Asian Americans.
6 Observational Results
[Figure 6 about here]
I begin my analysis with an examination of my main dependent variables: the vote and ideological
and competence assessments of congressional candidates. The CCES asks respondents to rate their can-
didates’ ideology on a seven-point ordered scale, from “Very Liberal” to “Very Conservative.” In order
to produce a more meaningful measure of how respondents view their candidates, I subtract this measure
from each respondent’s own self-reported ideological rating. This creates a 12-point measure of ideo-
logical distance of respondent from candidate, ranging from -6 to +6, in which negative values indicate
that the respondent views the candidate as to the ideological left of him or herself, while positive values
15
indicates that the respondent views the candidate to the right of him or her. The CCES also asks its
respondents to rate their candidate’s competence on a seven-point scale, from “Very Strong” to “Very
Weak.”
Figure 6 shows the average vote total, ideological rating, and competence broken down by race. In
examining vote totals by race, we observe that Asian candidates receive significantly more support in
the vote than their white, black, and Latino counterparts. The first observation of note is that Asian
Democratic candidates do significantly better in the vote than candidates of other racial subgroups, even
white. Asian Democrats received 43% of the white vote, while white Democrats received 39%, black
Democrats 40%, and Latino Democrats 35%. When comparing average ideological and competence
assessments by race, we see results that mirror results in the vote. Asian Democrats are seen as more
moderate than blacks or Latinos and are seen as roughly on par ideologically with white Democrats.
Asian Democrats are seen as on par with white Democrats with regards to competence assessments as
well, while black and Latino Democrats are seen as significantly less competent than their Asian and
white counterparts.6
[Table 5 about here]
The results in Figure 6 represent the average assessments of each candidate without taking into ac-
count the numerous other variables that could factor into candidate assessment. In order to account for
these variables, I turn to a logistic regression model for vote choice and an ordered logistic regression
model for ideological and competence assessments that takes into account the various candidate-specific
and respondent-level controls. Table 4 shows a logit model on vote choice and an ordered logit model on
ideological assessments and competence assessments. The main variables of interest are the candidate-
race variables. This is a binary variable that takes on the value of “1” for “Asian Democrat” if the
candidate is of Asian descent and “0” if the candidate is not of Asian descent.7 Latino and black candi-
6In order to test whether the advantage for Asian candidates are the result of most Asian candidates
being incumbents, I also compared the vote, ideology, and competence assessment among challengers.
The results among challengers mirror the results among incumbents and the results overall.
7South Asian candidates were coded as “Asian” for the purposes of this study.
16
dates were coded the same way, creating four racial dummy variables for each racial group (white, Asian,
black, and Latino). In all the models, white candidates are the excluded category, so the coefficient for
each racial variable represents the effect of candidate race when compared to white candidates. In order
to account for district-level variance, I used a random effects model with standard errors clustered at the
district level.
I incorporated a standard array of both candidate-level as well as respondent-level controls in the
model, including incumbency, whether the seat is an open seat, candidate and opposition spending, a
dummy for the cycle year, whether the respondent is of the same party as the candidate, and respondent
ideology, education, age, employment status, and gender. I also incorporated Cfscores as an ideological
control in the model, however in the vote model I use the absolute value of this score as a measure of
candidate extremity.
For the vote, the dependent variable was coded as “1” in the Democrat model if the respondent voted
for the Democrat, and “0” if the respondent did not vote for the Democrat. If whites are discriminating
against minority Democrats, we should see a significant and negative result on the coefficient for mi-
nority Democrats, whether they be black, Latino or Asian. The first column of Table 4 represents the
results for the vote model and these results show support for the Asian advantage hypothesis. Because
white candidates are the excluded category, the coefficient for Asian candidates represents a comparison
against white candidates with the same qualities. The most notable result is that Asian Democrats do
significantly better in the vote than white candidates with the same qualities. Asian Democrats also do
significantly better than Latino and black Democrats, who incur a penalty in the vote among whites.8
8Analysis for minority Republicans showed insignificant results for Republican candidates of all
racial groups, which indicates that whites evaluate minority Republicans differently than minority
Democrats. It is worth nothing that among the Asian Republicans who did run, only two were incumbents
(Charles Djou, R-HI and Anh “Joseph” Cao, R-LA), both of whom were representing majority-minority
districts that were heavily Democratic. All Asian Republicans who ran in 2010 and 2012 lost, which may
point to a greater weakness among Asian Republicans during these two cycles. It is possible that the null
result for Asian Republicans is an artifact of weaker candidates and that a stronger candidate pool might
reveal a stronger racial effect for Asians.
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These observational results are significant even after accounting for a diverse array of candidate and
respondent level controls, and provide strong support for the Asian advantage hypothesis. Most impor-
tantly, it shows that the experimental findings showing an Asian advantage extend to observational data
with real world candidates.
The second column in Table 4 shows the results of an ordered logit model of how far a respondent
perceives his or her candidate to be from his or her self-reported ideology.9 It is important to note that this
model uses a candidate’s Cfscore as a control for “true” ideology so that a candidate’s actual ideology is
taken into account in the model. Because negative values of the dependent variable means the respondent
sees his or her candidate as ideologically to the left of his or her own political position and because white
candidates are the excluded category, negative coefficients on the race variables indicate that respondents
see candidates of these races as more ideologically liberal when compared to white candidates of com-
parable qualities. Even after accounting for candidate ideology (as measured by Cfscores), the results
show that Asian candidates are seen as ideologically similar to white candidates. Among Democratic
candidates, both black and Latino candidates are perceived as ideologically to the left of respondents,
even after taking into account ideological controls, while the effect size for Asian candidates is notably
smaller and statistically insignificant.
The third column in Table 4 shows the results of an ordered logit model on competence rating. The
competence assessments are arranged such that higher values indicate higher ratings of competence.
Negative coefficients for the race variables indicate that respondents were more likely to see their minority
candidates as less competent than white candidates with similar characteristics.1011 The results of the
9For illustrative purposes, the cut-point intercepts were left out of this table.
10Because the survey question on candidate competence was only asked in the 2010 CCES, I could
only conduct the analysis on competence for the 2010 election.
11I included the ideological distance measure used as the dependent variable in the second column as
a control in the competence model. It is possible that perceptions of ideological leanings may have an
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competence model mirror the results of the ideology model. Black and Latino Democrats are seen as
significantly less competent than their white counterparts, but Asian Democrats are seen as more on
par with white candidates. While the coefficient for Asian candidates is negative, the strength of this
coefficient is not nearly as pronounced as it is for black and Latino candidates. It is also statistically
insignificant.
The results in Table 4 support the Asian advantage hypothesis; that Asian candidates, specifically
Asian Democrats, are seen as more ideologically moderate and on par with white candidates of similar
qualities. These results, in conjunction with the results from Figure 6, point to an observational reality
that matches the experimental results: Asian candidates appear to be advantaged in the electoral arena,
even when compared to white candidates. I discuss the implications of these findings in the next section.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The sum of these results points to an advantage for Asian candidates that holds across experimental
and observational contexts. These results provide strong evidence in support of the Asian advantage
hypothesis, showing that not only were Asian candidates not disadvantaged due to their race, they actually
consistently outperformed white candidates given the same biographies. In addition, this paper found
evidence against the foreign-threat hypothesis, showing that even when foreignness was cued, Asian
candidates outperformed their white counterparts significantly.
In the observational portion of the study, I find that real-world Asian candidates also seem to do better
in the vote, whether it be in comparison to their counterparts from other minority groups or to white
candidates. Asian candidates have a decided advantage in the vote and are also seen as ideologically
moderate after taking into account ideological controls.
influence on competence assessments so I accounted for this in the model. In the model of ideological
distance, competence is not included. The ideology model run using only the 2010 data with the com-
petence rating as a control yields similar results, so I have chosen to use the model that features more
observations.
19
Why would Asian candidates be advantaged when compared to white candidates? And why do
foreign-born Asian candidates do so well given the extensive literature on public opinion of Asians as
a foreign threat? The answer to the first question may lie within the measures of candidate evaluation.
Perceptual evaluations of Asian candidates in the low-information scenario show that they are indeed
evaluated favorably when it comes to valence qualities. Asians seen as moderate, which reflects the
“apolitical” stereotype. Despite the fact that Asian-Americans on the whole have been trending toward
the Democratic Party over the last 15 years (Wong et al., 2011; Green, 2013; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo,
2014), it does not appear as though this partisan orientation has colored political perceptions of Asian
candidates the same way it has with Latinos and blacks (Dawson, 1994; McDermott, 1998). In addition
to being seen as ideologically moderate, Asian candidates in the low-information scenario are also seen
as more likely to perform well when in office, which fits into the stereotype of Asians being competent
and industrious.
Why whites prefer foreign-born Asian candidates is more difficult question to answer. Within that
broader question lie two questions worth discussing. The first is, why might Asian candidates not be
penalized for being foreign, and the second is, why might whites actually prefer the candidacies of
foreign-born Asians? It is possible that Asian candidates are not penalized for being foreign because the
foreign-threat stereotype is conditional on the place Asian Americans hold in modern society. While the
stereotypes of Asians as inscrutable and foreign persist, their salience has varied throughout American
history, depending largely on context and who America considers to be its enemy overseas (Wu, 2003;
Chang, 2004). While in the the past, the perceived enemies of America have included Asian nations like
Japan and China, currently, Asians are not considered to be as great of a threat as Muslims or Latinos
(Salaita, 2005; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010), and therefore whites may not perceive Asian candidates as
a threat either. The other possibility is that, given the relative standing of Asians in America right now,
merely cuing foreignness is not enough to cue a foreign threat. If this is true, another experiment might
be needed to cue a foreign threat. Finally, it is possible that cueing foreignness may also cue valence
qualities as well. Foreign-born Asians who become accomplished enough to seek public office may fit
into the narrative of the hard-working Asian immigrant, which could in turn cue a positive response to
these candidacies.
20
It is also important to note that the implications of the Asian-advantage hypothesis are not necessarily
always positive. The model-minority stereotype may also set expectations for Asian candidates that
are unattainable, and may set them up for racially charged criticisms when things go wrong. Asian
candidates may be forced into running campaigns that appeal to these stereotypes in order to achieve
electoral success, and may be unable to run campaigns that emphasize different messages for fear of
political reprisal.
These results also beg a puzzling question: if Asian candidates are advantaged, why don’t we see
more Asian candidates running and winning elected office? Asian candidates are gradually realizing their
potential as political candidates, as we have seen the number of Asians seeking political office increase
substantially over the last decade. The continuing underrepresentation of Asians in office may be due to
factors that are independent of white voter discrimination. Asian-Americans participate at very low rates
compared to their white, black, and Latino counterparts, and it makes sense that these low participation
rates extends to Asians seeking elected office as well.
While this study has established the relative perceptual advantage of Asian candidates in low-information
elections, there are other avenues of research that remain open for further exploration. This paper looked
primarily at East-Asian candidates, specifically, Chinese candidates, while recognizing there is a pos-
sibility that the racial and political stereotypes that apply to East-Asian candidates may not apply to
South-Asian candidates. A separate or companion study examining South Asians would go a long way
toward recognizing seeing the of political stereotypes afflict this Asian subgroup. This study also did
not examine differences among Asian ethnicities. While there is evidence that whites generally view
East-Asians as a uniform racial group (Bobo, 2001; Chou and Feagin, 2008), whether this view of racial
uniformity holds in candidate evaluation is a yet unanswered question. It is possible that whites may
evaluate different Asian ethnicities in varying ways, given the different histories each Asian ethnic group
has in America (Chang, 2004; Wu, 2003; Chin, 2002).
As America moves towards a future with a majority-minority population, Asian Americans have the
potential to be a key part of a multiracial political future. It is clear that research about race and ethnicity
in American politics that includes Asians must consider the unique nature of racial effects imputed on
Asians as a racial subgroup.
21
Table 1: Demographic Summary of Turk Sample (White Respondents)
White Respondents Survey Sample Number
Democrat (with leaners) 59.14% 977
Republican (with leaners) 24.95% 412
Independent 16.09% 393
Income less than $40K 64.83% 1,071
with less than college degree 44.79% 740
Under 35 62.65% 1,035
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Bio A Bio B
Asian Vs. White Low-Info Vote
Figure 1: Vote in the Low-Information Scenario
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Figure 2: Candidate Perception in the Low-Information Scenario
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Figure 3: Vote in the Ideological Scenario
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Figure 4: Candidate Perception in the Ideological Scenario
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Figure 5: Vote in the Foreign-Born Scenario
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Table 2: Logit Model of Vote For Asian Candidate with Republican PID Interaction
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Low-Info A * Rep ID 0.263 (0.425)
Low-Info B * Rep ID -0.921 (0.524)
Liberal * Rep ID -1.788⇤⇤ (0.350)
Conservative * Rep ID 3.357⇤⇤ (0.481)
Foreign * Rep ID -0.246 (0.379)
Native * Rep ID 1.188⇤⇤ (0.374)
Low-Info A 1.980⇤⇤ (0.207)
Low-Info B 0.492⇤ (0.215)
Liberal 1.844⇤⇤ (0.188)
Conservative -0.804⇤⇤ (0.218)
Foreign 1.322⇤⇤ (0.178)
Native 0.747⇤⇤ (0.172)
Republican PID -0.541 (0.302)
Intercept -0.478⇤⇤ (0.134)
N 1,652
Log-likelihood -1423.594
c2(13) 455.487
*prob< .05, **prob< .01; Standard errors
Table 3: Racial Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections
Total % Republican % Democrat
Black 135 20% 80%
Latino 103 41% 59%
Asian 37 21% 79%
White 1,387 56% 44%
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Figure 6: Candidate Comparison of Vote, Ideological Assessment, and Competence Assessment by Race
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Table 4: Models of For Candidate Perceptions on Race
Variable Vote (Std. Err.) Ideology (Std. Err.) Competence (Std. Err.)
Candidate Race
Black Candidate -0.220⇤ (.086) -0.567⇤⇤ (.064) -0.596⇤⇤ (.101)
Latino Candidate -0.276⇤ (.121) -0.516⇤⇤ (.077) -0.503⇤⇤ (.153)
Asian Candidate 0.379⇤⇤ (.125) -0.171 (.091) -0.133 (.111)
Candidate Characteristics
Incumbent 0.612⇤⇤ (.066) -0.750⇤⇤ (.048) 0.245⇤⇤ (.069)
Open Seat 0.233⇤⇤ (.070) -0.092 (.053) 0.133 (.105)
Candidate Spending 0.247⇤⇤ (.052) -0.253⇤⇤ (.040) -0.049 (.059)
Opposition Spending -0.064⇤ (.049) 0.083⇤ (.037) -0.069 (.048)
CfScore -0.164 (.064) 0.734⇤⇤ (.048) 0.242⇤⇤ (.056)
Respondent Characteristics
Co-Partisan Respondent 3.115⇤⇤ (.039) 0.813⇤⇤ (.055) 1.201⇤⇤ (.075)
Respondent Ideology -0.646⇤⇤ (.012) -1.436⇤⇤ (.019) -0.090⇤⇤ (.023)
Education -0.007 (.014) -0.167⇤⇤ (.013) 0.097⇤⇤ (.018)
Age -0.000 (.007) -0.005⇤⇤ (.001) 0.002 (.001)
Unemployed -0.002 (.034) 0.135 (.007) -0.249⇤⇤ (.095)
Gender (female) 0.034 (.151) 0.255⇤⇤ (.031) 0.037 (.042)
Cycle (2012) 0.713⇤⇤ (.041) 0.165⇤⇤ (.034)
Ideological Distance -0.567⇤⇤ (.018)
Constant 0.718⇤⇤ (.151) -0.028⇤⇤ (.010)
No of Obs 41,966 32,685 16,014
Log-Liklihood -12334 -46173 -20780
*prob< .05, **prob< .01; Standard errors in parentheses
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